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Introduction 
 The recent events surrounding the financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession 
have sparked interest in uncertainty and in quantifying and documenting the effect of 
uncertainty shocks on an economy. A core difficulty in examining this issue is finding an 
appropriate proxy for uncertainty, a problem which researchers have solved by using a 
range of measures including stock market volatility indices, the frequency of newspaper 
articles mentioning uncertainty, and the forecast error on output projections (see Bloom 
(2009), Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013), and Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2010), 
among others). Previous scholars have also tried to illuminate the transmission channel of 
uncertainty from a theoretical perspective (see Bernanke (1983), Brennan and Schwartz 
(1985), McDonald and Siegel (1986), and others). While general macroeconomic 
uncertainty has attracted much attention, policy uncertainty is only recently beginning to 
generate interest (see Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015)). Uncertainty surrounding central 
bank actions has been largely ignored.  
 This paper attempts to explore this issue, one that we view as perhaps even more 
important to economists than that of general uncertainty due to its policy relevance. 
While general macroeconomic uncertainty may be irreducible, monetary policy 
uncertainty is responsive to forward guidance. Previous research has shown that forward 
guidance successfully lowers interest rate uncertainty (Filardo and Hoffman (2014)). The 
subsequent question is then, how do such fluctuations in monetary policy uncertainty 
affect real macroeconomic aggregates? The question is currently salient as the U.S. 
economy begins to exit the zero interest rate regime of the past decade. Figure 1 shows 
the relationship between output uncertainty, measured by output forecast dispersion, and 
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monetary policy uncertainty, measured by…. Prior to the financial crisis and zero-lower 
bound, the two measures roughly tracked each other. However, post-2008, monetary 
policy uncertainty has stayed at historically low levels, while output uncertainty rose 
upward (see Figure 1). But as the Federal Funds rate begins to creep upward and the 
media spotlight is directed at upcoming central bank actions, we would expect monetary 
policy uncertainty to rise, which may prove to impact economic conditions in and of 
itself. 
 We examine this issue using a highly flexible framework that allows for a time-
varying  response of macroeconomic aggregates to shocks to monetary policy 
uncertainty. By allowing for such temporal shifts, we construct a more dynamic model 
that allows for significant structural changes to occur at the zero-lower bound. The 
proposed TVP-VAR also incorporates stochastic volatility, of particular relevance due to 
the decline in interest rate volatility that accompanies a zero interest rate policy. We 
estimate the model using panel-level interest rate forecast dispersion, to best capture both 
fluctuations in the volatility of possible interest rate movements, as well as “Knightian” 
uncertainty, meaning the rise and fall in forecasters’ confidence of the future interest rate 
path.  
 Our results suggest that monetary policy uncertainty is of quantitative importance, 
particularly at the zero-lower bound, and affects macroeconomic conditions via two 
channels. First, an increase in monetary policy uncertainty leads to an immediate 
decrease in output, the magnitude of which depends on the dataset used. Second, higher 
levels of monetary policy uncertainty dampen the transmission of other monetary shocks. 
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Specifically, at higher levels of interest rate uncertainty, movements in either the Federal 
Funds rate or shocks to interest rate expectations (forward guidance) have a significantly 
smaller effect on output.  
 These results have important implications when taken in the context of the current 
state of the U.S. economy. As the Federal Reserve begins to exit the zero-lower bound, 
monetary policy uncertainty is at its’ highest levels since pre-2008. Given the impact 
forward guidance has on controlling uncertainty, the empirical findings show that the Fed 
has an additional tool with which it can stimulate output. Or, if left unguided, interest rate 
uncertainty can have direct and detrimental effects on output, or make other policy 
measures less effective.  
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the current literature on 
general macroeconomic uncertainty, Section 3 proposes basic theory through which 
monetary policy uncertainty can affect the macroeconomy, Sections 4 and 5 discuss the 
data and estimation procedure used, Section 6 presents the empirical results, Section 7 
covers additional robustness checks, and Section 8 concludes.  
A Literature Review of Uncertainty  
 The recent financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession catalyzed interest in 
quantifying if and how uncertainty affects business cycle dynamics. To date, the concept 
of uncertainty in economic literature has encompassed a wide range of concepts, 
reflecting uncertainty about GDP growth, consumer and producer uncertainty, and 
noneconomic events such as terrorism and war. Several key facts have been established 
about the behavior of uncertainty, that general “uncertainty” both rises during recessions 
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and falls during expansions, that it likely explains a significant portion of the drop in 
domestic GDP during the Great Recession, and that shocks to uncertainty affect behavior 
through multiple channels (Bloom, 2014). These theoretical channels consist of four 
mechanisms, two that suggest a negative relationship between uncertainty and output and 
two that suggest a positive relationship.  
I. Theory 
The first and most prominent theory regarding the effects of uncertainty 
fluctuations on economic activity is that of real options (Bernanke (1983), Brennan and 
Schwartz (1985), McDonald and Sigel (1986)). This theory postulates that firms view 
investment decisions as “options,” options which they can postpone to another point in 
the future. Thus, uncertainty makes firms more hesitant to make large investments, 
fearing the costs of making a large purchase if the reward is unknown. For example, a 
firm considering buying a new factory has the option to make the investment today, or to 
wait for additional information regarding future economic conditions – the potential 
return on that factory – by delaying the investment until a later date when uncertainty 
about the future dissipates. Such “real options” mechanisms only come into effect when 
investments are irreversible, or expensive and difficult to reverse. Firms must not be 
selling into a perfectly competitive marketplace, where the choice of investment in one 
period has no effect on profitability in a later one. If both these criteria are satisfied, 
increased uncertainty is theorized to have an immediate downward effect on real 
economic activity, incentivizing firms to postpone investment activities, followed by a 
rebound, as the “pent-up” investments are then simply made at a later date.  
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The second channel through which overall uncertainty is theorized to have a 
negative impact on real economic activity is related to risk aversion. Higher levels of 
uncertainty lead to increasing risk premia, as well as raise the probability of default via 
increased probability of “black swan” events, ultimately raising borrowing costs. This 
stifles investment activity and leads to reductions in macroeconomic growth (Arellano, 
Bai, and Kehoe (2010); Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014); Gilchrist, Sim, and 
Zakrasjek (2011)). A subset of this channel is that of what Bloom (2014) deems the 
“confidence effect,” whereby individuals have pessimistic beliefs about the future. In 
such a case, when individuals are highly uncertain about the future, to the point that the 
distribution of possible outcomes is actually unknown, pessimistic individuals act as 
though the worst possible scenario will occur, showing an aversion to ambiguity. Finally, 
aversion to the risk associated with higher uncertainty can lead to precautionary saving 
on the part of consumers (Bansal and Yaron (2004)), depressing current consumption 
spending. The potential offsetting increase in investment, however, will only happen if 
one assumes New Keynesian characteristics (sticky prices) and a closed economy. As 
shown in Leduc and Liu (2012), Basu and Bundick (2011), and Fernandez-Villaverde, 
Guerron-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramirez (2011), uncertainty shocks can depress 
output if prices and interest rates do not fall enough after the initial drop in consumption 
to stimulate investment.  
While the real options and risk premium channels point to a negative relationship 
between economic activity and uncertainty, two other theoretical channels point to a 
positive one. The first of these, growth options, is based on the idea that uncertainty can 
stimulate investment by making the potential reward seem even greater. This 
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phenomenon can serve as an explanation for the current tech boom in Silicon Valley – for 
a “start-up” tech firm, the cost of a poor outcome are relatively small, given the lack of 
capital requirements for a tech firm, while the potential good outcome (a highly 
successful company that can be sold for a premium in the current manner equity markets 
value tech firms) is highly profitable. The theory of growth options has been empirically 
investigated in Kraft, Schwartz, and Weiss (2013), who show that growth options are 
particularly important for firms investing heavily in R&D, to the point that higher levels 
of uncertainty raise their equity value. 
The fourth theoretical channel between uncertainty and economic activity is that 
of Oi-Hartman-Abel effects, named after Oi (1961), Hartman (1972), and Abel (1983). 
The theory postulates that firms may be risk-loving, not risk averse. Put differently, a 
firm may expand to take advantage of potential good outcomes, and contract to protect 
against poor ones. This is exemplified by the recent growth of the tech industry in Silicon 
Valley. Firms, seeing the potential for excellent financial outcomes, actively take on 
more risk, in an almost frenzied behavior. As such, an increase in uncertainty, if firms are 
risk-loving and optimistic, may lead to increased production. However, this theory only 
holds in the case of little to no adjustment costs, assuming firms can expand and contract 
relatively easily. 
The empirical literature that has tried to quantify the magnitude of these four 
effects through either estimating responses to historical movements in uncertainty, using 
structural models, or exploiting natural experiments such as climate disasters, has 
provided “suggestive but not conclusive evidence” (Bloom (2014)) that negative effects 
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outweigh the positive. A rise in uncertainty tends to be met with decreased short-run 
output growth, investment, hiring, consumption, and trade. The medium to long-run 
effects are much less conclusive.  
II. Policy Uncertainty 
While the literature surrounding output uncertainty has recently expanded into an 
extensive collection, there have been fewer studies of policy uncertainty, particularly 
monetary policy uncertainty. Two studies that have narrowed down general uncertainty to 
policy-based uncertainty are that of Born and Pfeifer (2011), who both theoretically and 
empirically investigate the effects of broad policy uncertainty, particularly fiscal policy 
uncertainty, as well as Shelton and Falk (2016), who examine electorally-induced policy 
uncertainty.  
Born and Pfeifer (2011) analyze the role of policy risk in business cycle 
fluctuations using an estimated New Keynesian model including policy risk, measuring 
uncertainty from aggregate time series using Sequential Monte Carlo Methods. Their 
chosen proxy for policy uncertainty includes a mix of uncertainty about labor and capital 
tax rates, monetary policy, and government spending. Although the authors find 
significant evidence for the presence of policy risk in the data, they show that the “pure 
uncertainty” effect of policy risk only plays a very small role in business cycle 
fluctuations (Born and Pfeifer (2011)). However, the authors acknowledge that this is due 
to the general equilibrium effects of the monetary authority’s strong and swift response 
that significantly dampens the estimated effects in the DSGE model. Without this 
response, the effect on output of an uncertainty shock would increase from -0.025% to -
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0.075%. However, a monetary authority that would not respond in such a way as it does 
in their original model would also imply unrealistically extreme business cycle volatility, 
an unlikely scenario. 
Shelton and Falk (2016) empirically examine policy uncertainty from an electoral 
standpoint, estimating the effect on investment in the manufacturing sector. Given that 
policies relevant to business investment vary by political party, uncertainty about 
upcoming governor political affiliation is a source of risk to firms when making 
investment decisions. The authors use an instrumental variables approach to estimate that 
the elasticity of manufacturing investment with respect to the vote margin of a 
gubernatorial election is -0.027. 
We provide a novel investigation of the effects of monetary policy uncertainty, 
differing from the aforementioned literature on uncertainty and general policy 
uncertainty. This comes at a time in which monetary policy uncertainty is in the spotlight, 
having experienced an unprecedented truncation by nearly a decade at the zero-lower 
bound. The policy implications of monetary policy uncertainty are motivated by the 
findings of Filardo and Hoffman (2014), who find that forward guidance not only 
effectively changes interest rate expectations, it lowers interest rate uncertainty – the term 
premia – as well. Doehr and Martinez-Garcia (2015) effectively show the quantitatively 
substantive effects of shocking interest rate expectations. However, failing to account for 
the corresponding negative shock to uncertainty from a guidance episode may understate 
the effectiveness of forward guidance as an alternative monetary policy tool. 
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The Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy Uncertainty 
I. Direct Effects: Real Options  
Similar to investment uncertainty, we propose that fluctuations in monetary policy 
uncertainty directly influence macroeconomic aggregates through the “real options” and 
channel. We propose that, when faced with increased uncertainty regarding the future 
path of interest rates, economic agents postpone their investment and hiring decisions, in 
the hopes of receiving clearer information in the near future about whether they are about 
to enter a contractionary or expansionary policy period (or neither), which would directly 
affect a firm’s ability to finance an investment decision, by raising or lowering their cost 
of debt, as well as signaling the state of the economy – the return that investment may 
yield in the near future. 
 In this way, an economy characterized by increased uncertainty regarding upcoming 
central bank actions will witness a period of decreased output and inflation, as firms 
postpone major investment and production decisions. On the other hand, economies in 
which central banks use clear forward guidance to illustrate their preferred policy path – 
or those that are bound by a zero interest rate policy – will eschew this phenomenon, as 
agents rightly believe that waiting to make investment decisions will produce no better 
information than that which they currently have on hand.  
II. Indirect Effects: Muting Policy Effectiveness Through Risk Aversion 
The second channel through which monetary policy uncertainty affects economic 
conditions indirect: by dampening the ability of the central bank to effectively use both 
traditional monetary policy as well as unconventional monetary policy, specifically 
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forward guidance.  The underlying channel was conceptually developed for general 
economic uncertainty in Bloom (2009), and expanded here to incorporate monetary 
policy and monetary policy expectations.  
Bloom develops a firm-level production model where each production unit has 
the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
  1)(~),,,~( LHKAHLKAF  
in productivity ( A~ ), capital (K), labor (L), and hours (H). Hours are included 
separately from wages to facilitate the determination of wages, which follows the 
approach in Caballero and Engle (1993), in which wages are determined by undertime 
and overtime hours around the standard work week. Each firm is faced with the following 
demand curve: 
 BPQ  
with elasticity  . Bloom combines these into the revenue function: 
))/1(1)(1())/1(1(/1)/1(1 )(~),,,,~(   LHKBAHLKBAR  
where A combines unit-level productivity and demand into one general index, 
termed “business conditions” These business conditions are key to the introduction of 
monetary policy and monetary policy expectations into the model. Bloom assumes 
business conditions evolve as an augmented geometric random walk, and models them as 
a multiplicative composite of three separate random walks. These three components 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
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include a macro-level component MtA , a firm-level component 
F
tiA , , and a unit-level 
component U tjiA ,, , to best model the assumptions that units within a single firm have 
linked investment behavior due to common firm-level business conditions, and that they 
still exhibit independent behavior from idiosyncratic unit-level shocks. Bloom models the 
three components as follows:  
),1( 11
M
tt
M
t
M
t WAA     MtW ~ )1,0(N  
where t is the standard deviation of business conditions, while MtW is a macro-
level i.i.d normal shock. The second component, the firm-level component, is modelled 
as: 
),1( ,1,1,,
F
titti
F
ti
F
ti WAA    )1,0(~, NW Rti  
where ti, is a firm-level trend in business conditions, while FtiW , is a firm-level 
i.i.d. normal shock. Finally, the unit-level component is modelled as: 
),1( ,,11,,,,
U
tjit
U
tji
U
tji WAA    )1,0(~,, NW U tji  
where U tjiW ,, is a unit-level i.i.d. normal shock. The stochastic volatility process 
and trend in demand conditions are assumed to follow two-point Markov chains. Bloom 
finishes this model by adding adjustment costs including partial irreversibilities, fixed 
disruption costs, and quadratic adjustment costs.  
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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driving process of the aforementioned business conditions, t . Bloom choses to model 
the volatility term as a two-state Markov process for simplicity, assuming it can either 
take on the value of “low uncertainty” or “high uncertainty,” and the probability of being 
in either state is only dependent on the current state. In reality, uncertainty can take a 
continuous range of values . In the following, we explore the possible driving process of 
those values. Currently, as written into the model, change in t affect the uncertainty of 
unit-level conditions, firm-level conditions, as well as macro-level conditions. Bloom 
notes that he also evaluated this assumption by simulating an uncertainty shock to only 
the variance of MtW , which led to broadly similar results to those described in full above. 
Thus, we are on sound footing to differentiate  t  into the following: 
W
t , macro-level uncertainty 
F
t , firm-level uncertainty 
U
t , unit-level uncertainty 
knowing that shocks to 
W
t lead to nearly the same results above. Macro-level 
conditions in the model consist of interest rates, prices, and wages. We decompose 
W
t
into these three components as follows: 
])([])([])([ )1()1()1(
w
t
P
t
i
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tt
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t
M
t U
     
1 ttt   
(7) 
(8) 
18 
 
1,,0  wtPtit   
Macro-level “business conditions” uncertainty is a blend of interest rate 
uncertainty, price level uncertainty, and wage uncertainty, where the relative weights of 
each component are allowed to vary each time period but always sum to one. We also 
extend the model to incorporate ambiguity aversion, or Knightian uncertainty, by scaling 
the individual volatilities by a factor t  that represents how known the distribution t  is.  
This is also allowed to vary each time period and is unique to each component (Knightian 
certainty of interest rates, Knightian certainty of prices, and Knightian certainty of 
wages). In the most extreme scenario of no Knightian uncertainty (the distribution of 
possible movements is perfectly known to firms), t  takes on a value of 0, so the 
exponential term collapses to 1, and no power effect comes into play to magnify the 
volatility term. On the other extreme, if there is complete Knightian uncertainty, t  takes 
on a value of 1, so the volatility term is squared before weighting it and combining it with 
the other components. 
In this way, monetary policy (interest rate) uncertainty is reflected in the model 
through fluctuations in it  as well as changes in it . Put differently, an increase in either 
the volatility of monetary policy shocks or a decrease in the certainty of firms about the 
possible distribution of those shocks both lead to an increase in Mt  , which Bloom 
shows shifts the thresholds of inaction outward. Thus, subsequent shocks to economic 
conditions that affect macro-level demand – such as a monetary policy shock – lead to 
dampened results of output. Similarly, Doehr and Martinez-Garcia (2015) show that 
(9) 
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shocks to interest rate expectations are as important as shocks to the immediate interest 
rate at the moment, moving output in a similar direction. Thus, an increase in monetary 
policy uncertainty leads to an indirect result of making policy actions, both conventional 
monetary policy as well as forward guidance, less effective. This highlights the potential 
importance of forward guidance at the zero-lower bound. If a central bank has engaged in 
a zero interest rate policy, truncating and lowering interest rate uncertainty, then shocks 
to interest rate expectations may be even more effective at the zero-lower bound than 
previously hypothesized. 
 Putting all the pieces together, monetary policy uncertainty has two different 
transmission channels with which it affects real economic conditions. First, it has a direct 
effect through the “wait and see” channel, similar to the idea of postponing investments 
in the traditional uncertainty literature. Second, monetary policy uncertainty dampens 
policy actions that affect interest rate shocks and interest rate expectations shocks 
(forward guidance) through the mechanisms of Knightian uncertainty and volatility that 
increase the areas of inaction for firms. 
Empirical Strategy 
I. Data 
 We use interest rate forecasts from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BCEI) 
survey, a survey of leading business economists, to generate our uncertainty proxies, as 
well as to gauge monetary policy expectations. The BCEI provides the panel’s monthly 
arithmetic average one quarter, two quarter, three quarter, and four quarter ahead 
forecasts of fifteen different macroeconomic variables, in addition to the top 90th 
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percentile forecast and the bottom 10th percentile forecast for each forecast horizon. To 
extract monetary policy uncertainty from this panel, we use the dispersion of the forecasts 
of the panel’s expectation of the rate on the three month Treasury bill, calculated as the 
difference between the top 90th percentile and the bottom 10th percentile.  Each month, 
we use the longest consistent forecast horizon available (four quarters ahead) to measure 
disagreement among forecasters as our primary measure of monetary policy uncertainty. 
We also use the reported arithmetic mean forecast of the corresponding four quarter 
ahead interest rate as the measure of interest rate expectations in the TVP-VAR. This 
panel of forecasts is taken from 1991:M7 through 2015:M11. 
We make forecast dispersion our benchmark measure of policy uncertainty, rather 
than forecast errors or stock market volatility, two commonly used metrics, due to several 
factors. Measures of forecast error, while undoubtedly capturing some aspects of 
uncertainty, are also measuring “wrongness,” as well as uncertainty – one can be 
completely certain and still be incorrect about the future, which would be recorded as a 
large forecast error. Equity and credit market volatilities, other commonly used measures, 
were not chosen for the benchmark, as equity markets are too far removed from what we 
are specifically capturing – monetary policy uncertainty – while measures of volatility in 
credit markets, e.g. the Ted spread or various ARCH measures, confound perceived 
default risk along with actual interest rate uncertainty, again not reflecting pure monetary 
policy uncertainty. We choose to tease out and use Knightian uncertainty from the SPF to 
more clearly distinguish between known default risks and true uncertainty, where the 
expected distribution of outcomes is unknown (Knight (1921)). The BCEI provides a rich 
picture of forecaster’s immediate interest rate expectations, and a measure of cross-
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sectional disagreement derived from such survey data has been shown to be an accurate 
portrayal of the corresponding Knightian uncertainty (see Bomberger (1996), Patton and 
Timmerman (2010)).  
  As a robustness check, we use a separate measure of monetary policy uncertainty. 
We also utilize data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, which surveys a panel of economists and offers individual 
forecasts for a variety of macroeconomic variables.  The dataset contains the entire panel 
of forecasts for the interest rate on the three month Treasury bill one quarter ahead, two 
quarters ahead, three quarters ahead, and one year ahead. To construct a measure of 
uncertainty from this, we take the standard deviation of the forecast for the rate on the 
three month Treasury one year ahead, for the same reasons described above regarding 
forecast dispersion. We use the corresponding median forecast of the interest rate each 
quarter as our measure of the actual interest rate expectations in the TVP-VAR when 
running the model with SPF data rather than BCEI data.  
All other variables used in our analysis – the core inflation rate, the civilian 
unemployment rate, the Federal Funds rate, oil prices, and monetary base growth – were 
taken from the St. Louis Federal Reserve database.  
 A more detailed description of the data and sources can be found in the Appendix. 
All data is at either a quarterly or monthly frequency from 1991:M7 through 2015:M11 
or 1981:Q3 through 2015:Q2, to match the respective BCEI or SPF panel.  
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II. Methodology 
Time-varying parameter VARs (TVP-VARs) are broadly used in economic 
literature to capture the possible time-varying nature of the macroeconomy, particularly 
in monetary policy analysis (Nakajima, 2009). After Primiceri (2005) introduced a TVP-
VAR model that allows for all parameters to vary over time, several papers followed that 
analyzed the time-varying structure of the macroeconomy in certain ways (see Benati and 
Mumtaz (2005), Baumeister et al. (2008), and D’Agostino et al. (2008)). Among these, 
we highlight Nakajima (2009), who added the possibility of stochastic volatility into the 
TVP-VAR, as well as the relevant contributions of Franta (2011), who employed an 
identification scheme based on sign restrictions in the Japanese economy. Given our goal 
of examining the underlying structural shifts in the U.S. economy at the zero-lower 
bound, particularly in regards to the transmission of monetary policy with uncertainty and 
expectations, we chose to utilize the modeling framework proposed by Franta (2011) that 
allows for both stochastic volatility as well as sign restrictions. 
A TVP-VAR that allows for stochastic volatility enables us to capture both 
temporary and permanent shifts in parameters, including that of the volatility of the 
disturbances. The idea of stochastic volatility was first proposed by Black (1976), and has 
been further developed, particularly in the field of financial economics (Nakajima, 2009). 
When the data generating process has both time-varying coefficients as well as stochastic 
shocks, then using a model that exclusively allows coefficients to vary and assumes 
constant volatility may potentially bias estimates. This is of particular relevance when 
modeling the economy at the zero-lower bound, as we do here. The zero-lower bound 
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truncates possible downward movements in both the Federal Funds rate itself, as well as 
expectations of the 3-month Treasury bill, significantly reducing potential fluctuations of 
those two variables. In this way, a TVP-VAR with stochastic volatility allows us to more 
accurately incorporate the role of the zero-lower bound in the transmission of monetary 
policy throughout the macroeconomy, rather than assuming the volatility of the 
disturbances of the interest rate, interest rate expectations, and monetary policy 
uncertainty are constant at any level of the Federal Funds rate. Similarly, given that our 
objective is examining the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, it is crucial to 
distinguish between changes in the size of exogenous innovations—the stochastic 
volatility—and underlying shifts in the transmission mechanism itself (Mumtaz, 2005).  
The second key characteristic of our chosen methodology is that of incorporating 
sign restrictions in the TVP-VAR, following the framework of Franta (2011). Sign 
restrictions are a manner in which we can further incorporate the binding effects of the 
zero-lower bound into the model—as well as avoid encountering puzzles common in 
macroeconomic VARs (Franta, 2011).  The zero-lower bound on the nominal interest rate 
is implemented during the identification of the shocks rather than during the initial model 
estimation. Previous attempts in the literature to examine the transmission of monetary 
policy at the zero-lower bound impose assumptions from the very beginning of the 
estimation, such as treating the interest rate as a censored variable, using a Markov-
switching VAR, or a estimating a censored VAR where the latent variable capture the 
stance of monetary policy and equals the interest rate if it exceeds zero (see Nakajima 
(2011), Fujiwara (2006), and Iwata and Wu (2006)). The approach we follow, à la Franta 
(2011), imposes the zero lower bound at a later stage, when estimating impulse response 
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functions, while estimating the initial reduced-form TVP-VAR without restrictions as it is 
flexible enough to handle nonlinearities stemming from the floor on interest rates. 
Similarly, using structural assumptions in the form of sign restrictions lets us relax the 
oftentimes inappropriate assumptions of the more typical recursive VAR ordering, that 
shocks to some endogenous variables do not have any simultaneous effects on those that 
come before them in the recursive ordering. Sign restrictions allow us to base our 
empirical model in economic theory rather than be tied to the characteristics of the 
specific dataset itself and a particular recursive ordering, making it easier to interpret the 
TVP VAR evidence using the standard New-Keynesian model. For those shocks that do 
not have a robust underlying economic theory – namely, shocks to monetary policy 
uncertainty and the effects of shocks to other economic variables on policy uncertainty – 
we adapt the model framework to allow for an unspecified response or effect, relaxing 
any sign restrictions to let the data simply speak for itself. A more detailed description of 
the exact restrictions chosen can be found in the discussion of the benchmark model. 
The following model and estimation approach closely follow Primiceri (2005)2, a 
multivariate time series framework with varying coefficients that captures nonlinearities 
and time-variation in the parameters, while also accounting for possible 
heteroscedasticity of the disturbances (Arratibel and Michaelis, 2014). We estimate the 
VAR model in the following manner: 
tltttttt uyycy   ,11,1 ...     t = 1,…,T 
                                                            
2 See Primiceri (2005) for a more in depth analysis of the model specification, assumptions, and estimation 
technique, as well as Nakajima (2009) for a more extensive discussion of the role of stochastic volatility. 
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where the vector of endogenous variables yt is of the size n x 1; ct , the vector of time-
varying coefficients that multiply constant terms of of the size n x n; the time-varying 
coefficients ti, with the lag length t  have the size n x n, and ut , of the size size n x 1, are 
unknown stochastic shocks with time-variation in the covariance matrix of the error 
terms.  
The matrix capturing simultaneous relations, At, is lower triangular, denoted as: 
At =
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t is an M(Mp + 1) x 1 vector of the effects of lagged endogenous variables on the 
system, and the matrix of standard deviations of the structural shocks,  t , is diagonal: 
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The reduced form time-varying VAR to be estimated can then be summarized as: 
 t ttttt AXy  1      t = p  + 1,…T, 
The dynamics of the time-varying parameters follow a random walk without drift, while 
the covariance matrix evolves as a geometric random walk with no drift, shown as: 
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1
1,, ttiti u     i = 1,…M2p + M, 
1
1,, ttiti v     i = 1,…(M2- M)/2, 
log( ti , ) = log( 1, ti ) + wti  i = 1,…M 
Using a random walk to model the underlying dynamics provides a highly flexible 
framework to capture the evolving nature of different parameters coming from potential 
shifts in the macroeconomy (Arratibel and Michaelis, 2014).  
The vector of model innovations [ 't , 'tu , 'tv , 'tw ] is assumed to be jointly 
normally distributed, as the following: 
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where vectors ut, vt, and wt  consist of innovations as introduced above, and the matrices 
U, V and W are positive definite. V is assumed to be block diagonal, implying that the 
parameters of the contemporaneous effects among variables are independent, 
uncorrelated across equations.  
 Consistent with the Bayesian approach, a Gibbs sampler is used to evaluate the 
posterior distribution of the unobservable states ti , , tj , , tk , , and the hyperparameters 
U, V, and W (see Blake and Mumtaz, 2012, for a detailed explanation of Bayesian 
estimation of TVP-VARs with stochastic volatility). To perform the estimation of the 
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posteriors, the Gibbs sampler provides draws from the conditional posteriors of the set of 
parameters. In order to do this, we need to specify the distribution of the priors. U, V, and 
W follow the independent inverse Wishart distribution, consistent with the literature, 
while the priors for the initial states of the other parameters, ti , , tj , , and log( tk , ) are 
normally distributed. Consistent with Primiceri (2005), we use a small subset of the data 
set estimated through ordinary least squares (specifically, the first 40 months of the time 
series) to form estimations used in the specification of the prior distributions.  
 After initializing the parameters, a draw is taken from the distribution of the 
vector  , given the other parameters A,  , hyperparameters U, and the data. Next, the 
Gibbs sampler goes over U first, producing a draw, and continues on over the other 
subsets of the parameter set (A, V,  , and W). This process is then repeated, ultimately 
providing posterior numerical evaluations of the parameters. For this estimation, we use 
the same specification of the priors (kq, ks, and kw) as in Primiceri (2005), which are 
consistent with the literature, and slightly tighter than those used in Nakajima (2009), 
attributing more of the time variation to the disturbances ( ) rather than the parameter 
estimates (  ) themselves. Primiceri’s tighter priors negate the possibility of erroneously 
attributing additional time variation to the parameters when they are truly closer to time 
invariant.3 This is further confirmed by Stock and Watson (1996), who show that models 
                                                            
3 We also estimate the model using the code and methodology of Nakajima (2009) as a robustness check. 
The results show higher parameter instability and less stochastic volatility, while nevertheless confirming 
the critical importance of monetary policy uncertainty and expectations in the transmission of monetary 
policy, and the structural shifts that occur at the zero-lower bound. More detailed results are available upon 
request from the author. 
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with large a priori time variation do poorly in forecasting, and that allowing for 
significant time variation in the volatilities is fundamental to improving the model fit. 
 To recover the impulse-response functions (IRF’s) after the initial model 
estimation, we identify five structural shocks (monetary policy uncertainty, interest rate 
expectations, inflation, unemployment, and the Federal Funds rate) by using sign 
restrictions on the contemporaneous reactions of the other variables to the shocks, as in 
Franta (2011).4 We base our sign restrictions on assumptions about the behavior of the 
system, imposing qualitative information requirements on the IRF’s. Certain responses 
are left unidentified, to be determined by the data (see Faust, 1998, Uhlig, 2005) when 
there is uncertainty surrounding the underlying economic theory, or in the case of our 
measure of monetary policy uncertainty, where the specific variable itself and its 
construction is novel in economic literature. We consider four different types of 
restrictions: positive, negative, zero, or unidentified (see Table 2), and motivate our sign 
choices by results found in Doehr and Martínez-García (2015), in which the authors 
estimate a four variable panel VAR that includes interest rate expectations in addition to 
inflation, unemployment, and the Federal Funds rate. The sign restrictions imposed here 
on the effects from shocks to “realized” economic variables (inflation, unemployment, 
and the Federal Funds rate) are consistent with the findings of Doehr and Martínez-
García (2015)—as well as economic theory. The restrictions imposed on the effects from 
shocks to interest rate expectations account for the reversal in the response of output by 
leaving that response unspecified, while restricting the responses of inflation and the 
                                                            
4 See Franta (2011) for a detailed explanation of the estimation procedure for impulse response functions 
using sign restrictions.  
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Federal Funds rate to nearly zero. Shocks to monetary policy uncertainty or the effect of a 
shock on monetary policy uncertainty are always left unspecified.  
 The model estimation and additional procedures were estimated in Matlab5 using 
one lag of the endogenous variables. Given the relatively high number of parameters 
estimated in this five variable VAR, allowing for any more lags leads to convergence 
issues, as the number of parameters to be estimated rapidly explodes. We use a sample of 
10,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler, with a burn-in of 2,000.  
III. Results 
Benchmark Model 
 The specification of our benchmark TVP VAR is motivated by the New 
Keynesian model, the standard three variable VAR, augmented with both expectations of 
future monetary policy as well as uncertainty surrounding those expectations. The 
inclusion of the first of these two channels—expectations of monetary policy—is driven 
by the results found in Doehr and Martínez-García (2015), that expectations of monetary 
policy themselves can generate a response in macroeconomic variables even if no policy 
change takes place. This allows us to explicitly differentiate between innovations to 
anticipated monetary policy (news shocks) and unexpected monetary policy shocks. The 
inclusion of monetary policy uncertainty is motivated by the underlying theory of 
forward guidance: that providing guidance to economic agents not only changes interest 
rate expectations themselves, but decreases the corresponding uncertainty, particularly 
                                                            
5 The model used code for a TVP VAR with stochastic volatility and sign restrictions, made publicly 
available by Haroon Mumtaz (Benati and Mumtaz, 2005). 
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when traditional policy rates are fixed by the zero-lower bound (Filardo and Hoffman 
(2014).  By including uncertainty in the VAR, we also not only allow for the simulation 
of shocks to uncertainty itself, but we incorporate any potential indirect, non-linear 
effects described previously in the transmission mechanism of monetary uncertainty into 
the econometric model. We use the dispersion of the expectation of the one-year ahead 
rate on the 3-Month Treasury as the proxy for monetary policy uncertainty in the 
benchmark, performing robustness checks by using alternative measures (the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters) in a later model. We find that monetary policy uncertainty plays 
a significant role in the macroeconomy not only directly, but by indirectly shaping the 
transmission of other shocks throughout the economy. We focus our analysis on the 
impulse-response functions, the recovered stochastic volatilities, and an analysis of 
nonlinearities in the model.  
A. Impulse-Response Functions 
The impulse response functions from the benchmark model are presented in 
Figure 3, showing the responses over 5 years (60 months) and the time period 2001:M7 – 
2015:M11 to one standard deviation shocks to the endogenous variables in the VAR.  We 
can first clearly see what influences monetary policy uncertainty itself, and that, in some 
cases, the way in which other macroeconomic variables affect monetary policy 
uncertainty has changed over time. In Figure 3b, we find that a shock to interest rate 
expectations leads to a rise in monetary policy uncertainty. Of important note is the fact 
that this effect is magnified at the zero-lower bound: after 2008, a rise in forecasts of 
future short-term rates has nearly twice the initial effect on monetary policy uncertainty. 
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We theorize that this is due, in part, to the fact that at the zero-lower bound, interest rate 
expectations are truncated at zero—the possibility of downward revisions to forecasts is 
eliminated, as the distribution itself can move no farther downward. Thus, an upward 
shock to interest rate expectations at the zero-lower bound shifts the distribution upward, 
inducing the possibility of downward revisions to forecasts. This impulse-response 
function can also be explained by the focus on interest rates when they are bounded by 
zero. We see in the data in Figure 2 that over the past 3-4 quarters, as talk of rising rates 
has begun in earnest, interest rate expectations as well as monetary policy uncertainty 
have started to tick upward. Even a very small positive movement in rate forecasts, 
relative to the historical range of interest rates, leads to this spike in policy uncertainty, as 
the security of the zero-lower bound policy is left behind even though we are still at the 
zero-lower bound. Shocks to unemployment have also had time-varying effects on 
monetary policy uncertainty (see Figure 3d), as prior to the Great Recession a positive 
shock to unemployment had very little impact on uncertainty. However, this response has 
gradually been magnified since 2008, implying increased confidence in the Federal 
Reserve’s response to such an event. We also find that a shock to the Federal Funds rate 
leads to a spike in uncertainty. This effect is most heightened at the onset of the financial 
crisis, after which it dies down. Interestingly, the magnitude of the response is in the 
process of spiking upward again, implying an increased sensitivity to movements in the 
Federal Funds rate. This may again be due to the loss of the binding zero-lower bound on 
the potential distribution of rates. After being truncated by zero for so long, an upward 
movement induces the possibility of downward movements again. Another possible 
explanation is the increased scrutiny of the Federal Reserve’s actions in the past few 
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quarters, as talks of rising rates begin in earnest. Thus, any uptick in rates by the central 
bank that may signal the end of the zero interest rate policy leads to a heightened 
response of uncertainty. 
We also highlight several other key impulse-response functions in the benchmark 
model. In Figure 3b, we see that even when including monetary policy uncertainty in the 
model, the effect on the unemployment rate from a shock to interest rate expectations still 
displays the extreme parameter instability found in Doehr and Martínez-García (2015), 
where the response of output entirely reverses at the zero lower bound: a rise in expected 
monetary policy leads to an increase in unemployment, in sharp contrast to the decrease 
in unemployment found prior to 2007. In Figure 3e, we show that a tightening of the 
policy instrument itself, the Federal Funds rate, leads to an immediate decrease in 
inflation. Using core inflation rather than headline inflation in conjunction with including 
monetary policy expectations as an additional variable successfully mitigates the price 
puzzle found in many such VARs, providing corroborating evidence for Sims (1992) and 
Giordani (2004)’s theory that price puzzles arise from un-modelled inflationary pressures 
that lead to price increases only captured by including commodity prices such as oil to 
resolve the puzzle. Given that core inflation excludes such un-modelled pressures, this 
impulse-response function demonstrates the effectiveness of unexpected monetary policy 
in bringing down non-commodity prices.  
Finally, we consider the direct effects of a shock to monetary policy uncertainty 
itself on other macroeconomic indicators (see Figure 3a). As postulated in the “wait and 
see” theory, the responses of output and inflation are immediate and imply a depressed 
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economic state, with an increase in unemployment and decrease in inflation. These also 
display parameter instability, with the responses heightened at the zero-lower bound. It is 
important, however, to gauge the magnitude of these responses relative to, say, a 
traditional monetary policy shock. The equivalent positive one standard deviation shock 
to the Federal Funds rate leads to a maximum response of unemployment of nearly 3.0%, 
while the uncertainty shock alone only leads to an increase on the order of 0.3%, or 10% 
the size of the former response. This is a relatively small direct effect when considered in 
the context of traditional monetary policy, though nevertheless a conclusive and long 
lasting effect. These impulse-response functions show that when traditional monetary 
policy becomes constrained by the zero-lower bound, forward guidance shocks that 
decrease monetary policy uncertainty can indeed have direct effects on stimulating 
output, albeit not of the magnitude of traditional policy. However, it is also important to 
consider the possible non-linear effects of uncertainty that are not immediately reflected 
in these impulse-response functions but nevertheless may shape how forward guidance 
ripples through the economy. 
B. Modeling Non-Linearities in Uncertainty  
While it has been shown that interest rate expectations play a significant and 
direct role in shaping the macroeconomy, monetary policy uncertainty may play a more 
nuanced role, though just as important. Monetary policy uncertainty is akin to the ‘second 
moment’ of interest rate expectations, capturing the steadfastness with which economic 
agents hold their beliefs about the future path of policy. Simply shocking the certainty 
with which people hold their beliefs is not enough to generate significant economic 
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responses; however, the propagation of other shocks throughout the economy is 
dependent on the level of certainty in the future policy path at that time. As stated in the 
discussion of the transmission channel of monetary policy uncertainty, higher levels of 
uncertainty may dampen the ultimate effect of expected monetary policy shocks by 
causing agents to place more weight on the current interest rate environment when faced 
with a series of unknown movements in future interest rates. We examine this empirically 
by calculating the cumulative response of other variables to shocks to unexpected and 
expected monetary policy at each horizon in the impulse-response function (s=1…s=20), 
and regress these cumulative impacts against the level of monetary policy uncertainty 
measured at that time, while simultaneously controlling for other potential confounding 
variables. Results are shown in Figure 4. 
 Our results show that the level of monetary policy uncertainty plays a formidable 
role in the dynamics of the macroeconomy, particularly in regards to the effectiveness of 
unconventional monetary policy, forward guidance. In Figure 4, we can see that a one 
unit increase in monetary policy uncertainty – roughly equivalent to a one standard 
deviation increase - is associated with a decrease in the maximum impulse-response 
function of unemployment of -0.063%. Considering that the average maximum response 
of unemployment is 0.28%, this represents a 23% decrease in the typical response of 
unemployment to an expectations shock, a significant amount, statistically significant at 
the 99% confidence level. As theorized, higher levels of uncertainty significantly dampen 
the propagation of unconventional monetary policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve. 
Similarly, we find that a one unit increase in monetary policy uncertainty is associated 
with a decrease in the cumulative response of unemployment from s=1 to s=20 of -1.20, 
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or of 42% of the average cumulative response, 2.81, again significant at the 99% 
confidence level. Finally, we consider the shape of the response, the slope of the response 
function. We find that a one unit increase in uncertainty is associated with a decrease in 
the slope of -0.06, significant at the 5% level, implying that not only does uncertainty 
cause less of a cumulative total response in output, but makes that response more gradual.  
Robustness Checks6 
I. Survey of Professional Forecasters 
To consider the robustness of the results to other measures of uncertainty, we also 
utilize data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (see Appendix for additional 
detail). Given that the SPF reports the entire panel, rather than simply the median forecast 
and select percentiles, we construct our measure of interest rate uncertainty as the 
standard deviation of the one year ahead forecasts of the 3-month Treasury bill each 
quarter. The other, “real” variables – core inflation, unemployment, and the Federal 
Funds rate – are kept the same in the TVP-VAR. Results from the corresponding 
impulse-response functions and multivariate regressions are reported in Figures 5 and 6 
in the Appendix. 
Overall, we find that the same themes emerge that were found in the Blue Chip data. 
Monetary policy uncertainty has a direct and detrimental effect on output, and higher 
levels of uncertainty dampen the ultimate effect of monetary policy actions (shocks to 
anticipated and unanticipated monetary policy). The key differences of the SPF results lie 
                                                            
6 Although omitted here for the sake of brevity, we also run robustness checks using different lengths of the 
forecast horizon, of both the Blue Chip and SPF data, and find confirmatory results in shorter forecast 
horizons. Results are available upon request from the authors. 
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in the relative magnitude of these effects. The SPF data yields smaller direct effects, and 
larger indirect effects (non-linearities). Beginning with the former, we see that a direct 
shock to monetary policy uncertainty leads to a significantly smaller and less conclusive 
negative response of output than we find in the Blue Chip data – and one that recovers 
quicker. However, higher levels of monetary policy uncertainty have indirect effects on 
the transmission of monetary policy shocks to both output and inflation, by dampening 
the effect on output (as found in the Blue Chip data), as well as strengthening the 
response of inflation, something not seen in the Blue Chip data. Put differently, higher 
levels of monetary policy uncertainty actually make an interest rate hike more effective at 
pulling inflation down. This could be due to forecasters, in times of high monetary policy 
uncertainty, grabbing onto whatever guidance is provided to them by the central bank 
when they form their inflation expectations, and ultimately propagating those into actual 
inflation. In times of lower uncertainty, guidance is simply less impactful, as forecasters 
already have their own information sets they are relatively confident in, making 
additional news less effective. 
Concluding Remarks 
 The dual effects of monetary policy uncertainty on the economy, directly 
depressing output as well as indirectly stifling the effectiveness of both conventional and 
non-conventional monetary policy actions, illuminates the complexities of an 
expectations-driven business cycle. It also provides evidence for the importance of 
managing interest rate uncertainty as a policy tool in and of itself. In this paper we 
empirically investigate both channels with a TVP-VAR that allows for stochastic 
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volatility, augmenting the traditional three-variable New-Keynesian model with both 
interest rate expectations and interest rate uncertainty. We find that short term interest 
rate uncertainty plays a moderate role in its immediate effect on current output, while 
playing a highly significant role in the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the 
economy. These effects are seen just as strongly at the zero-lower bound as in “normal” 
policy times. As such, we find strong evidence that downward pressure on monetary 
policy uncertainty can be an important policy tool in stimulating output and assuring the 
proper transmission of other policy shocks. This provides a case for the use of forward 
guidance when traditional monetary policy has become bounded by zero. While the 
immediate effects are not as quantitatively substantial as direct shocks to the Federal 
Funds Rate itself, when moving the Federal Funds Rate is no longer a viable option for 
policymakers, guidance can provide another means of steering the economy. Managing 
policy expectations, as shown in Doehr and Martinez-Garcia (2015), in conjunction with 
managing policy uncertainty, can together make a significant opportunity for guiding an 
economy when traditional monetary policy measures are no longer realistic options. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 - Data 
 Description Source Comments 
ie3m,t+4ӏt(j) Expected short-term rate 
(SPF) 
FRB.P Forecasts 4 quarters ahead of the 3-
month T-bill (annualized rates, %) for 
a varying sample of j forecasters in 
each quarter 
UCc MP Monetary policy 
uncertainty – dispersion 
(SPF) 
FRB.P Standard deviation of ie3m,t+4ӏt for each 
quarter for a varying sample of j 
forecasters in each quarter 
ie3m,t+4ӏt(j) Expected short-term rate 
(BC) 
BCEI Forecasts 4 quarters ahead of the 3-
month T-bill (annualized rates, %) for 
a varying sample of j forecasters in 
each quarter. Dataset reports 
arithmetic average of panel j. 
UCc MP Monetary policy 
uncertainty – dispersion 
(BC) 
BCEI Difference between top 90th and 
bottom 10th decile of  ie3m,t+4ӏt for each 
month for a varying sample of j 
forecasters in each month 
πct Inflation rate (core CPI) FRED Seasonally-adjusted, month-over-
month (%) 
ut Unemployment rate FRED Seasonally-adjusted (%) 
yt Real GDP growth FRED Seasonally-adjusted, month-over-
month (%) 
it Fed Funds rate FRED Annualized rate (%) 
MG Monetary Base FRED St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base, 
month-over-month (%) 
OG Oil Price FRED West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil 
Price, month-over-month (%) 
Note: All data calculated by the authors are available upon request. The acronym SPF stands for the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters; BCEI stands for Blue Chip Economic Indicators; FRED stands for Federal 
Reserve Economic Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; FRB.P stands for Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia; and FRB.A stands for Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
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Table 2 – Sign Restrictions 
Shock Monetary 
Policy 
Uncertainty 
Interest 
Rate 
Expectations 
Core 
Inflation 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Federal 
Funds 
Rate 
Monetary 
Policy 
Uncertainty 
+ None None None None 
Interest Rate 
Expectations 
None + - None + 
Core Inflation None 0 + None + 
Unemployment 
Rate 
None None - + - 
Federal Funds 
Rate 
None 0 - + + 
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Figure 1 – Uncertainty Measures 
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Figure 2 – TVP-VAR Model Inputs 
 
Effective Federal Funds Rate 
 
Civilian Unemployment Rate 
 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
1981 1985 1989 1992 1996 2000 2004 2007 2011 2015
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1981 1985 1989 1992 1996 2000 2004 2007 2011 2015
42 
 
 
 
Core Inflation Rate 
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Monetary Policy Uncertainty (Dispersion of Interest Rate Expectations, SPF) 
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Figure 4a – Nonlinearities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4b – Nonlinearities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Maximum IRF ‐ Shock: 
FFR; Response: 
Unemployment
Maximum IRF ‐ Shock: 
FFR; Response: Inflation
Maximum IRF ‐ Shock: 
Tbill6; Response: 
Unemployment
Maximum IRF ‐ Shock: 
Tbill6; Response: 
Inflation
Uncertainty ‐2.634*** ‐0.0157*** ‐0.373*** ‐0.200***
(0.449) (0.00408) (0.0539) (0.0290)
Tbill6 ‐1.582*** 0.00942** ‐0.0942* ‐0.0498*
(0.416) (0.00378) (0.0500) (0.0269)
Inflation ‐0.986 ‐0.00957 0.128 ‐0.134
(1.819) (0.0165) (0.218) (0.118)
Unemployment 0.311** 0.00663*** 0.0814*** ‐0.0139*
(0.125) (0.00113) (0.0150) (0.00808)
Fed Funds Rate 0.439 ‐0.00803*** 0.0494 0.0437**
(0.315) (0.00287) (0.0379) (0.0204)
Monetary Base ‐0.0834** ‐0.000620* ‐0.00518 0.00302
(0.0400) (0.000363) (0.00480) (0.00259)
Oil Price ‐0.0261 3.92e‐05 0.000392 0.000365
(0.0162) (0.000147) (0.00194) (0.00105)
Constant 7.902*** 0.00598 0.682*** 0.505***
(1.056) (0.00960) (0.127) (0.0684)
Observations 173 173 173 173
R‐squared 0.774 0.420 0.708 0.506
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Cumulative Response at 
s=60: Unemployment; 
Shock: FFR
Cumulative Response at 
s=60: Inflation; Shock: 
FFR
Cumulative Response at 
s=60: Unemployment; 
Shock: Tbill6
Cumulative Response at 
s=60: Inflation; Shock: 
Tbill6
Uncertainty ‐1.658*** ‐0.00950 ‐0.202*** 0.00461
(0.406) (0.0359) (0.0714) (0.00672)
Tbill6 ‐0.902** ‐0.00965 ‐0.0985 0.00315
(0.377) (0.0333) (0.0662) (0.00624)
Inflation ‐2.199 ‐0.188 0.183 ‐0.00706
(1.646) (0.146) (0.289) (0.0272)
Unemployment 0.189* 0.00712 0.0515** ‐0.00294
(0.113) (0.00999) (0.0198) (0.00187)
Fed Funds Rate 0.294 0.0126 0.0115 ‐0.000576
(0.285) (0.0253) (0.0502) (0.00472)
Monetary Base ‐0.0284 7.99e‐05 ‐0.000374 ‐0.000142
(0.0362) (0.00320) (0.00636) (0.000599)
Oil Price 0.00191 ‐0.000856 0.00246 ‐6.84e‐05
(0.0146) (0.00130) (0.00257) (0.000242)
Constant 4.829*** ‐0.0164 0.519*** 0.0167
(0.956) (0.0846) (0.168) (0.0158)
Observations 173 173 173 173
R‐squared 0.587 0.026 0.501 0.126
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4c – Nonlinearities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
IRF Slope Through s=30; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Unemployment
IRF Slope Through s=30; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Inflation
IRF Slope Through s=30; 
Shock: Tbill6, Response: 
Unemployment
IRF Slope Through s=30; 
Shock: Tbill6, Response: 
Inflation
Uncertainty ‐0.0553*** ‐0.000317 ‐0.00675*** 0.000154
(0.0135) (0.00120) (0.00238) (0.000224)
Tbill6 ‐0.0301** ‐0.000322 ‐0.00328 0.000105
(0.0126) (0.00111) (0.00221) (0.000208)
Inflation ‐0.0733 ‐0.00627 0.00609 ‐0.000235
(0.0549) (0.00486) (0.00964) (0.000908)
Unemployment 0.00629* 0.000237 0.00172** ‐9.79e‐05
(0.00376) (0.000333) (0.000662) (6.23e‐05)
Fed Funds Rate 0.00980 0.000420 0.000383 ‐1.92e‐05
(0.00951) (0.000842) (0.00167) (0.000157)
Monetary Base ‐0.000948 2.66e‐06 ‐1.25e‐05 ‐4.74e‐06
(0.00121) (0.000107) (0.000212) (2.00e‐05)
Oil Price 6.37e‐05 ‐2.85e‐05 8.22e‐05 ‐2.28e‐06
(0.000488) (4.32e‐05) (8.58e‐05) (8.08e‐06)
Constant 0.161*** ‐0.000547 0.0173*** 0.000558
(0.0319) (0.00282) (0.00560) (0.000527)
Observations 173 173 173 173
R‐squared 0.587 0.026 0.501 0.126
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 6b – Nonlinearities (SPF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6c – Nonlinearities (SPF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Cumulative Response at 
s=20: Unemployment; 
Shock: FFR
Cumulative Response at 
s=20: Inflation; Shock: FFR
Cumulative Response at 
s=20: Unemployment; 
Shock: Tbill6
Cumulative Response at 
s=20: Inflation; Shock: 
Tbill6
Uncertainty ‐3.103** ‐1.419*** 1.291 0.128
(1.454) (0.233) (0.970) (0.0938)
Tbill6 ‐0.157 0.0534 ‐0.276 ‐0.0362
(0.541) (0.0866) (0.361) (0.0349)
Inflation 0.928 0.276 0.101 ‐0.0342
(1.448) (0.232) (0.966) (0.0934)
Unemployment ‐0.104 ‐0.0314 ‐0.286* ‐0.0110
(0.236) (0.0378) (0.157) (0.0152)
Fed Funds Rate 0.110 ‐0.0468 0.0640 0.0251
(0.447) (0.0714) (0.298) (0.0288)
Monetary Base ‐0.0728* 0.0207*** ‐0.0656** ‐0.00738***
(0.0410) (0.00656) (0.0273) (0.00264)
Oil Price ‐0.0195 0.000756 0.00173 ‐0.000967
(0.0181) (0.00289) (0.0120) (0.00117)
Constant 8.204*** 0.444 5.009*** 0.650***
(1.729) (0.277) (1.153) (0.112)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R‐squared 0.079 0.360 0.093 0.091
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
IRF Slope Through s=4; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Unemployment
IRF Slope Through s=8; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Unemployment
IRF Slope Through s=12; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Unemployment
IRF Slope Through s=20; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Unemployment
Uncertainty ‐0.207*** ‐0.176** ‐0.168** ‐0.155**
(0.0620) (0.0758) (0.0814) (0.0727)
Tbill6 0.0103 ‐0.00306 ‐0.00913 ‐0.00785
(0.0231) (0.0282) (0.0303) (0.0271)
Inflation 0.109* 0.0842 0.0621 0.0464
(0.0618) (0.0755) (0.0810) (0.0724)
Unemployment ‐0.00495 ‐0.00463 ‐0.00476 ‐0.00522
(0.0101) (0.0123) (0.0132) (0.0118)
Fed Funds Rate ‐0.0141 ‐0.00112 0.00571 0.00549
(0.0190) (0.0233) (0.0250) (0.0223)
Monetary Base ‐0.00130 ‐0.00300 ‐0.00370 ‐0.00364*
(0.00175) (0.00214) (0.00229) (0.00205)
Oil Price ‐0.000230 ‐0.000827 ‐0.00108 ‐0.000973
(0.000770) (0.000941) (0.00101) (0.000903)
Constant 0.708*** 0.604*** 0.527*** 0.410***
(0.0737) (0.0901) (0.0967) (0.0865)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R‐squared 0.130 0.081 0.073 0.079
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 6d – Nonlinearities (SPF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6e – Nonlinearities (SPF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
IRF Slope Through s=4; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Inflation
IRF Slope Through s=8; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Inflation
IRF Slope Through s=12; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Inflation
IRF Slope Through s=20; 
Shock: FFR, Response: 
Inflation
Uncertainty ‐0.112*** ‐0.117*** ‐0.101*** ‐0.0710***
(0.0290) (0.0214) (0.0170) (0.0116)
Tbill6 0.00403 0.00379 0.00332 0.00267
(0.0108) (0.00798) (0.00632) (0.00433)
Inflation 0.0229 0.0226 0.0195 0.0138
(0.0289) (0.0213) (0.0169) (0.0116)
Unemployment 0.00172 ‐0.00126 ‐0.00177 ‐0.00157
(0.00472) (0.00348) (0.00276) (0.00189)
Fed Funds Rate ‐0.00181 ‐0.00285 ‐0.00281 ‐0.00234
(0.00892) (0.00658) (0.00521) (0.00357)
Monetary Base 0.00223*** 0.00183*** 0.00150*** 0.00103***
(0.000818) (0.000604) (0.000478) (0.000328)
Oil Price 5.23e‐05 8.01e‐05 6.37e‐05 3.78e‐05
(0.000361) (0.000266) (0.000211) (0.000144)
Constant ‐0.0736** 0.00944 0.0237 0.0222
(0.0345) (0.0255) (0.0202) (0.0138)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R‐squared 0.200 0.311 0.348 0.360
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
IRF Slope Through s=4; Shock: 
Tbill6, Response: 
Unemployment
IRF Slope Through s=8; Shock: 
Tbill6, Response: 
Unemployment
IRF Slope Through s=12; 
Shock: Tbill6, Response: 
Unemployment
IRF Slope Through s=20; 
Shock: Tbill6, Response: 
Unemployment
Uncertainty ‐0.157*** ‐0.0307 0.0360 0.0646
(0.0520) (0.0580) (0.0583) (0.0485)
Tbill6 ‐0.0156 ‐0.0145 ‐0.0138 ‐0.0138
(0.0194) (0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0181)
Inflation 0.0327 0.0148 0.00812 0.00507
(0.0518) (0.0577) (0.0580) (0.0483)
Unemployment ‐0.0266*** ‐0.0218** ‐0.0185* ‐0.0143*
(0.00844) (0.00941) (0.00947) (0.00787)
Fed Funds Rate 0.00297 0.00243 0.00210 0.00320
(0.0160) (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0149)
Monetary Base ‐0.000678 ‐0.00267 ‐0.00337** ‐0.00328**
(0.00146) (0.00163) (0.00164) (0.00137)
Oil Price 0.000107 0.000146 0.000151 8.66e‐05
(0.000646) (0.000720) (0.000724) (0.000602)
Constant 0.404*** 0.359*** 0.317*** 0.250***
(0.0618) (0.0689) (0.0693) (0.0577)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R‐squared 0.210 0.085 0.076 0.093
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 6f – Nonlinearities (SPF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
IRF Slope Through s=4; Shock: 
Tbill6, Response: Inflation
IRF Slope Through s=8; Shock: 
Tbill6, Response: Inflation
IRF Slope Through s=12; Shock: 
Tbill6, Response: Inflation
IRF Slope Through s=20; Shock: 
Tbill6, Response: Inflation
Uncertainty 0.0305** 0.0210** 0.0138* 0.00642
(0.0148) (0.00964) (0.00717) (0.00469)
Tbill6 ‐0.00329 ‐0.00262 ‐0.00240 ‐0.00181
(0.00549) (0.00359) (0.00267) (0.00175)
Inflation ‐0.0102 ‐0.00612 ‐0.00379 ‐0.00171
(0.0147) (0.00960) (0.00714) (0.00467)
Unemployment ‐0.000612 ‐0.000243 ‐0.000391 ‐0.000548
(0.00239) (0.00157) (0.00116) (0.000762)
Fed Funds Rate 0.00263 0.00206 0.00180 0.00126
(0.00453) (0.00296) (0.00220) (0.00144)
Monetary Base ‐0.00107** ‐0.000724*** ‐0.000555*** ‐0.000369***
(0.000416) (0.000272) (0.000202) (0.000132)
Oil Price ‐6.77e‐06 ‐3.81e‐05 ‐5.19e‐05 ‐4.84e‐05
(0.000183) (0.000120) (8.91e‐05) (5.83e‐05)
Constant 0.0649*** 0.0517*** 0.0437*** 0.0325***
(0.0175) (0.0115) (0.00853) (0.00558)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R‐squared 0.107 0.113 0.105 0.091
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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